Wednesday, March 17, 2010

Network Access Control Looking Like a Flub

March 21, 2008 by Greg Ferro · 5 Comments 

While I am no expert on NAC I am deeply unim­pressed by the whole tech­no­logy. It looks like a whole bunch of trouble that is guar­an­teed to keep you up all night.

I see today that Lockdown Networks couldn’t get fund­ing and are going out of busi­ness. This sug­gests to me that you should not go any­where near NAC.

Notification

Lockdown Networks closes the door

If the Venture Capitalists think NAC is a bust, then the whole mar­ket space is look­ing like trouble.

I have looked briefly at NAC a couple of times and the soft­ware just looks very ugly. It adds lay­ers and lay­ers of soft­ware, wrapped around the Windows oper­at­ing sys­tem. Years of exper­i­ence of Windows sug­gest that this is not a good idea™.

I can accept that NAC for Windows XP might work, after all, the NAC people have have five years to work out the bugs. But with WinXP SP3 com­ing, and Microsoft not giv­ing up on Vista and push­ing out WinV SP1 I wouldn’t want to be look­ing after desktop and laptop fleet that had NAC. The NAC cli­ent soft­ware is sure to need updating.

As a net­work geek, it also need a lot of things to be avail­able for it to work cor­rectly. Indeed, it becomes a mis­sion crit­ical sys­tem as soon as you roll it out which is a dis­trac­tion from the real busi­ness function.

Another con­cern as an out­sider, is that the migra­tion away from Windows to MAC and Linux looks to be gain­ing momentum and almost none of the NAC products work on these platforms.

View

NAC is an idea that has its place in ultra secure oper­a­tions such as defense /​ mil­it­ary, but I don’t think it’s viable for real world applications.

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Comments

5 Responses to “Network Access Control Looking Like a Flub”
  1. Knowledge, vis­ib­il­ity and sim­pli­city, in this order, are my guide for all design, deploy­ment and oper­a­tion. NAC helps to improve vis­ib­il­ity, but makes it more com­plex. But vis­ib­il­ity has higher pri­or­ity then sim­pli­city and NAC is there­fore, by my defin­i­tion, a good tool. The ques­tion is, what vis­ib­il­ity do NAC deliver? It’s not about net­work vis­ib­il­ity; NAC gives vis­ib­il­ity to the people work­ing with hosts. NAC have been pro­moted through the net­work chan­nels, that’s why I believe NAC have failed to expand. Let’s see what’s hap­pen when MS starts to push for NAP? What I have seen, NAP is not the best, but it will be presen­ted to host people. I think this will increase all kinds of NAC/​NAP know­ledge and acceptance.

    As I have done both Cisco’s NAC frame­work and Clean Access install­a­tions in real net­works, the effect is the same. As soon as we reach the point where we add a ‘block-​​filter’, the num­ber of server and cli­ent machine not known are more then expec­ted. The secur­ity in NAC, as I see it, are that the host people sud­denly will see *all* machines on the net­work and they can start incor­por­ate them in IT-​​policies. Network people already know it’s more then the offi­cial num­bers, by count­ing the great num­ber of switch-​​port in use. But host people nor­mally only ‘know’ the num­ber by the SMS, AD-​​accounts, AV-​​tools . . which of course only show ‘known’ machines.

    NAC gives the pos­sib­il­ity to ‘see’ everything con­nec­ted on the net­work, which have never been easy before. Every cus­tomer I visit tells me that they have ‘good’ know­ledge of their con­nec­ted machines, but all my NAC install­a­tion proves that’s not true.

    I agree that the agent part is a pain, but that goes for all SW installed in any com­puter when the under­ly­ing OS is changed. But if the people work­ing with the com­puters, not the net­work, handle NAC, I think it has a fea­ture. Network people have to be involved, espe­cially when NAC is deployed, but they should not be ‘in charge’ of NAC.

    The prob­lem I see is how to handle machines which should not be handle by NAC, like copy machines, IP man­aged air con­di­tions, IP based keyboard/​mouse/​screen adapters … name it, you will have more then you ever believe and the num­ber will grow. I have tried to com­bine NAC/802.1x/VLAN/MPLS to keep ‘strange’ machines out of NAC; it seems to work pretty well. But everything starts with deep know­ledge in net­work­ing, sys­tem and applic­a­tions. Knowledge is the key whatever tech­no­logy used.

    Best Regards
     – Per Håkansson
    SpeedApp AB
    CCIE 2446

    PS: Defense & mil­it­ary seems to be the people who have best con­trol already, I think there are many other com­pan­ies who needs NAC even more.

  2. Greg Ferro says:

    I dis­agree.

    It is mum­bojumbo to assert that NAC improves everything. It makes hosts and net­works more com­plex thus deliv­er­ing neg­at­ive out­comes for business.

    It stops users from adapt­ing and adopt­ing new ways of work­ing, and thus causes com­pan­ies to stag­nate and ulti­mately fail. It is the ugli­est face of secur­ity con­sult­ing gone too far.

    If NAC is a viable tech­no­logy that has real mean­ing then it must be intro­duced as part of the OS, and not as some sort crufty add on.

    If you can­not see your net­work, hosts and serv­ers with the tools we have today, then you are not using other tech­no­lo­gies correctly.

    NAC is not the answer, its a fail­ure to ask the right question.

  3. I see your point, but I have not seen any good tool that actu­ally finds as many machines as the NAC box. If I run Nessus, as an example, I still cant see everything, because the people who adds stuff to the net­work ‘hide’ them behind host FW’s and NAT box. They have put them there because they ‘need’ it, but they also know it’s against the IT-​​policy in the com­pany and there­fore some of the machines are hid­den. The NAC can be fooled too, but it’s not that easy.

    NAC does not improve everything, but it will give the IT-​​department bet­ter know­ledge of what machine they have con­nec­ted to the net­work. This way they can start adding unknown machine to the secur­ity and IT policy used in the company.

  4. Greg Ferro says:

    The fact that people need to ‘hide’ some­thing is the prob­lem. People should want to approach IT to get sup­port and help. In real­ity, IT secur­ity in big com­pan­ies can be way out of con­trol and pre­vent new ser­vices and processes.

    Everyone in a com­pany should be able to find ways to improve busi­ness per­form­ance and out­comes. If the only way to do that is to ‘hide’, then that is what happens.

    The money spent on NAC should be spent on more serv­ers, more skills, more people so that busi­ness units or pro­jects do not feel that they have to these kind of things to get the job done.

    Again, is NAC is the answer, what was the question ?

  5. Mike B says:

    Greg,
    We use Cisco CNR for DHCP and have cus­tom coded some scripts for our own Homebrew NAC.

    Here is what happens.

    Every pc that comes into our shop has its HW specs, user and mac poun­ded into a database.

    When a PC powers up, it requests a DHCP lease– using CNR, we authen­tic­ate that request against the DB. If it is legit we allow the request to pro­ceed. If its not legit, it sends an email and calls another cus­tom script to kill the port via SNMP.

    We pre­vent static IP’s by using DHCP snoop­ing com­bined with DAI on the switches.

    This gets us what NAC does without requir­ing soft­ware agents all over the place.

    Obviously, it’s much more com­plic­ated under the hood than what I’ve laid out in half a para­graph, but it gets you the gen­eral idea that folks are doing “rouge” device detec­tion and mit­ig­a­tion, without buy­ing into the NAC hype.

    Mike

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